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cannot exclude it to be present.
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1 Introduction
Persistent variation across geographic areas and across providers in the use of medical procedures
represents a largely unexplained basic evidence in the health economics literature. A common view is
that such pattern of variation emerges out of an asymmetric relationtioship between a subject patient
and a dominant physician basically because of the disagreement across physician groups about the shape
of the health production function, i.e. the function transforming medical care into health outcomes.
This presumption seems hard to be rejected in the case of pure regional variation (Wennberg and
Gittelsohn, 1973). When we come to physician practice at least part of observed variation can be
plausibly ascribed to a process of “assortative mating of doctors who are aggressive with patients who
prefer aggressive treatment” (Phelps, 2000, page 251).
The relation between style of practice and assortative mating has been surprisingly neglected in
the literature despite its strong implications for patients’ welfare. Practice variation leads to a welfare
loss whenever patients share homogenous preferences for “product” attributes, i.e. there is a single
treatment that well informed patients prefer (Ryan and Hughes, 1997, San Miguel et al., 2000). Phelps
and Mooney (1993) suggest that such a loss is of a comparable magnitude to the one emerging out of
ex-post moral hazard in health insurance contracts and likewise impractical to be entirely recaptured
to society. Targeted policies are invoked on a benefit-cost basis in the purpose of reducing welfare losses
until marginal benefits pair marginal costs. Huge investments in the production and dissemination of
novel evidence about the eﬃcacy of various medical procedures are quite easy to justify in this framework
(Phelps, 2000). On the contrary, whenever consumers have heterogenous preferences, provided they are
able to identify provider treatment styles and are free to choose accordingly, then “product variety”
will improve welfare. Ascertaining the existence of assortative mating mechanisms therefore lessens the
argument in favor of active policies aimed at reducing practice variation and at the same time provides
a rationale for policies aimed at improving patients’ awareness of providers style of practice.
In this paper we take a first step in this direction and bring into focus the main ingredients to
evaluate the relevance of assortative mating in healthcare markets. Generally speaking, the analyzed
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case should be characterized by diﬀerence in style of practice across providers, patients’ ability to observe
provider’s style of practice and quality, patients’ heterogenous preferences for alternative treatments
and free choice among alternative providers. Accordingly, the empirical model must be able to identify
sistematic variation in practice across providers net of a full set of patients covariates, and to account
for nonrandom selection of patients into hospitals. The source of the latter mechanism can be twofold:
patients unobserved frailty and patients unobserved preferences for a given treatment. We show in the
paper under which circumstances it is possible to interpret this self-selection mechanism as evidence of
assortative mating.
We deal on a case study which has attracted a massive attention in the health economics literature.
Cesarean section (CS) is one of the most common surgical procedure worldwide. In Italy and the
US it is the second most frequent procedure with respectively 200,000 and 900,000 CS performed
yearly. Quite some concern has been expressed about the increasing adoption of such a technology for
birth beyond the realm of clinical abuse. According to OECD data CS incidence rose in developed
countries from 6% in 1970 to more than 20% in 1998. This evidence conflicts with WHO (1985)
recommendations on appropriate technology for birth, suggesting that “there is no justification, in
any specific geographic region, to have more than 10-15% cesarean section births”. Similar clinical
guidelines have been proposed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2002) and by the
US Department of Health and Human Resources (2000). The conflict between clinical evidence and
suggested guidelines stimulated quite some research eﬀorts in the health economics literature to gain
insights about the reasons behind this apparent overuse. Economists’ contributions are deeply rooted
into the so called Physician Demand Induction framework, i.e. the idea that in the face of negative
income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care
(McGuire and Pauly, 1991). Income shocks exploited in the literature arise from competitive pressure
in the local market as measured by variation in physician density (Cromwell and Mitchell, 1986), from
exogenous reduction in reimbursement tariﬀs (Gruber et al., 1999), from declining fertility (Gruber
and Owings, 1996), from increasing threat of malpractice suit (Dubay et al., 1999). The role played
3
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by patients’ preferences has been left unexplored in the health economics literature despite anecdoctal
evidence of its relevance.1 A currently prevailing wisdom in the health policy literature seems to favour
the idea that obstetricians’ and patients’ preferences jointly play a major role in determing delivery
procedures (Paterson-Brown, 1998, Minkoﬀ and Chevernak, 2003).
We present in this paper novel evidence about variation in treatment style for deliveries across
two classes of providers, public and private hospitals, on a nationwide representative sample of Italian
women in childbirth. We measure treatment style as the proportion of deliveries performed by CS in
the two classes of hospitals. As it comes clear by looking at Table 1 CS rates are markedly diﬀerent
across the two classes mainly because of the private hospitals inclination to schedule CS. Conditional
on laboring CS rates are indeed quite similar. Our general conjecture is that this diﬀerence in style of
practice can be recognized by patients and drive, at least partially, a nonrandom self-sorting of patients
into the two hospitals’ types. Actually, scheduled CS cannot be viewed as a purely unilateral clinical
decision a physician makes on behalf of his patient. It is made in large advance, allowing the patient
to switch to another provider in case she disagrees with the scheduled decision. Moreover the extent
of information asymmetry involved here between the physician and his patient seems quite limited:
the set of alternative technologies for birth is small and the social knowledge about each alternative
is spread and diﬀuse also in terms of their clinical implications. Finally patients preferences for the
treatment are influenced by idiosyncratic factors like aversion to risk for the newborn, aversion to pain
and suﬀering, taste for natural processes. These general features make scheduled CS a favorable case
study for ascertaining the existence of assortative mating mechanisms. Some further aspects peculiar to
our Italian case study are worth noticing here. First of all, in the italian NHS women are completely free
to choose the treating hospital -public or private- with no out-of-pocket payments. Secondly, public
1According to MacKenzie (1999) in 1996 30% of total antepartum cesarean section performed at the John Radcliﬀe
Hospital in Oxford are on maternal request. This phenomenon was almost absent in the previous two decades. Al-Mufti
et al. (1997) suggest that 31% of London female obstetricians with an uncomplicated singleton pregnancy at term would
choose an elective CS for themselves. Lo (2003) provides evidence of significant increase in CS due to preferences for
specific birthdays in China.
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and private hospitals are naturally sorted in terms of quality and infra-structural capacity. Public
hospitals have emergency surgical capacity and newborn intensive care units (WHO, 1985, recommends
that ”natural deliveries after a caesarean should normally be encouraged wherever emergency surgical
capacity is available”). On the other hand, private hospitals do not have emergency room and therefore
are not allowed to admit on an emergency. Finally the presence of teaching personnel increases the
role of professional and deontic rewards in the public leading to a higher propensity to improve clinical
practices and to adopt the more appropriate ones. Because of these reasons, public hospitals are
nationwide perceived in Italy as of higher quality for delivery. We exploit this quality diﬀerence in the
interpretation of women self-selection mechanism into hospital type.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
To motivate our empirical analysis of assortative mating in scheduled CS we develop an interpretative
model for the hospital choice and the delivery mode that incorporates the role of patient preferences
for clinical and non clinical quality, aversion to risk and pain. We consider the scheduling decision as
the possible outcome of a bargaining process between the physician and his patient. This process is
conditioned, on the physician side, by deontic reasons and adherence to professional norms, financial
incentives, overall clinical endowments in the operating hospital, fear for malpractice suit. On the
patient side, bargaining is aﬀected by preferences for the treatment, preferences for clinical and non
clinical quality.
The econometric model we adopt acknowledges the binary nature of the endogenous variable rep-
resented by treatment: planned CS versus attempt of natural delivery (ND). The analysis of practice
variation across public and private providers is performed by including among the determinants for
the probability of the treatment a dummy indicating the provider chosen by the patient, beside a set
of observable risk factors. Scheduling is jointly decided with provider choice, through an individual
process in which patients’ preferences for the alternative treatments and information on provider’s style
of practice play a major role. This brings about self-selection of patients into providers based on observ-
ables and unobservables characteristics that also determine the given treatment, making the provider
5
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dummy variable potentially endogenous. An adequate model to represent this phenomenon is the re-
cursive probit model with endogenous dummy (Heckman, 1978). The main objects of the inference are
the coeﬃcient of the potentially endogenous dummy variable indicating the chosen provider, and the
correlation coeﬃcient between the error terms of the two equations. Through the first coeﬃcient it is
possible to evaluate the existence and the extent of the diﬀerence in style of practice across providers.
The second coeﬃcient signals the presence of a self-selection mechanism operating through unobservable
variables. We explain in the paper that in presence of assortative mating both coeﬃcients are expected
to be non null. We find that the propensity to scheduling a CS across providers is codetermined with
patient self-sorting into hospital type as hinted by the battery of exogenity tests we apply. We mea-
sure a significantly higher inclination to practice CS scheduling in private hospitals and conclude that
assortative mating in the public-private dimension is of minor relevance, even if we cannot exclude it
to be present.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we elaborate an interpretative model for the hospital
choice and the delivery mode. Section 3 presents our empirical model. Section 4 illustrates our case
study, presents the estimation results and their interpretation. Section 6 contains some final remarks.
2 Understanding the decision process for cesarean section schedul-
ing and hospital choice
We outline here an interpretative model for hospital choice and delivery mode accounting for some
peculiar features in our case study. In particular we emphasise the role played by patients’ preferences
for the treatment.
We consider that each individual belonging to the population of women in childbirth is described by
an indicator r comprising all risk factors for a diﬃcult delivery. The population is distributed between
r and r in ascending order of risk. There are only two hospitals where a woman can deliver in: a private
(PR-h) and a public one (PU-h).2
2For ease of exposition we will consider the obstetrician and the hospital where he operates as interchangeable. In a
6
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The PU-h obstetrician provides appropriate treatments as far as he “unilaterally” follows professional
guidelines in order to gain deontic premiums.3 The rule is like the following: if the women is of type r
where r = r = rSPU > r then schedule her a CS (action SPU , where S stands for “scheduled” CS and
the uppercase indicates that the clinical decision is appropriate); try a ND and therefore enter labor
(action LPU , where L stands for “labor”) otherwise. No bargaining over the treatment is accomodated
by the PU-h.
The PR-h obstetrician is prompt to accomodate patients’ preferences in accordance to his own
objectives and therefore to bargain with the patient under the threat of patient’s switch to the PU-
h. He might propose to his patient an appropriate scheduled CS (SPR), a non appropriate scheduled
CS (sPR), or to attempt a ND (LPR). SPR is given according to a more lenient decision rule with
respect to the PU-h (i.e. rSPR < rSPU ). This is due to staﬃng and technical equipment limitations,
as generally argued by Minkoﬀ and Chevernak (2003), in the PR-h. Therefore appropriate scheduled
CS is equally frequent across the two hospital’s types conditional on staﬃng and technical equipment.
sPR is administred according to an even more lenient rule ( rsPR < rSPR < rSPU ), i.e. a rule that leads
to a more frequent scheduling of a CS even after controlling for diﬀerences in staﬃng and technical
equipment.
Coming to the payoﬀs, as far as the PU-h is assumed to behave according to automatic unilateral
rules, it is not an agent in our simple game. It simply represents the patient’s outside option. Concerning
the incentives for the PR-h, we pose that by performing a SPR the hospital/obstetrician gains an
economic rent, A, comprising the anticipated diﬀential reimbursement of CS, time cost savings and
lower eﬀorts with respect to ND. By performing sPR the economic rent A is reduced of a positive
amount a < A comprising the monetary equivalent for deontic penalties suﬀered by the obstetrician
that overlooks his Hippocratic hoath. We assume that the deontic penalty is a decreasing function of
the patient’s risk indicator, a(r), with ar < 0. LPR is associated to a positive payoﬀ b reflecting the
sense we assume that the hospital is under the complete control of the staﬀed physicians and therefore implied agency
problems are totally absent.
3Frank (2004) discusses unilateralism in clinical decisions within the paradigm of behavioral economics.
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anticipated economic rents, plausibly smaller than those accruing for performing a scheduled CS, net
of deontic penalties for performing a CS after labor. Therefore the payoﬀ b is definitely lower than
A − a(r). We are now able to characterize the cutoﬀ value for sPR, rsPR , as the value of women risk
indicator such that A−a(rsPR) = b. The decision to enter labor is always appropriate as far as there is
no relative convenience to its overuse: it is never administered to a high risk patient, i.e. with r > rSPR .
We finally describe patient’s payoﬀs. Let BcH denote the payoﬀ accruing to the patient in case her
chosen hospital H (with H =PU-h, PR-h) adopts the clinical decision c, where c ∈ C = (S, s, L).
Consider first the riskiest patient, i.e. that having a risk indicator r > rSPU . She will value the highest
the opportunity to receive a scheduled CS in PU-h. The very high risk patient alwas refers to PU-h
as far as, conditional on her risk factors, she receives there an appropriate scheduled CS. Referring to
PU-h is her best choice given that higher risk patients demand good unilateral clinical decisions. Once
we exclude the riskiest patients then the structure of patient’s payoﬀ have implications on the joint
decisions of CS scheduling and hospital choice.
When the patient have a strong aversion to a painful and risky ND even in the public hospital, i.e.
BsPR > B
L
H , she will opt for the PR-h. We call this the “preference for scheduled CS” case. It is worth
noticing that in this case if r ∈ [rsPR , rsPU ) the patient opt for the PR-h and accept the unilateral
clinical decision adopted there, i.e. to schedule an inappropriate CS. On the contrary when we turn to
the very low risk tail, i.e. patient with r < rsPR , PR-h obstetrician is to make her entering labor: the
payoﬀ for an appropriate ND is higher than that accruing to him in case of an inappropriate scheduled
CS because of large deontic penalty. In this case, a bargaining between the patient and the PR-h might
emerge. Her threat of switch to the PU-h makes the bargaining over scheduled CS beneficial for the
PR-h in face of the loss of a patient. Gain from bargaining is equal to A− a(r); concomitantly, for the
patient it is equal to BsPR − BLPU . Assuming a very simple Nash bargaining framework4 we can state
that a patient with risk profile r < rsPR will refer to PR-h and receive an inappropriate scheduled CS
as far as the the following inequality is satisfied:
4A similar framework has been adopted for dealing with the hospital-insurer relationship by Brooks et al. (1997) and
Maude-Griﬃn et al. (2004).
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(A− a(r))γ · ¡BsPR −BLPU¢1−γ > bγ · ¡BLPR −BLPU¢1−γ
where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents obstetrician’s bargaining power and 1 − γ that of his patient. The choice
of a PR-h and the concomitant scheduling of an inappropriate CS is therefore more (less) frequent the
lower (higher) is the bargaining power of the hospital/obstetrician, the stronger (weaker) are economic
incentives on the PR-h, the higher (lower) is patient’s riskiness, the larger (lower) is patient aversion to
pain and suﬀering.
Another relevant preference structure is the one that describes a patient highly valuing the (non
clinical) quality aspects provided by a private hospital. Within this preference structure a case that is
worth discussing is the “preference for a ND in a pleasant environment”, while the one concerned with
scheduled CS is similar to the “preference for scheduled CS” we discussed above. In this case, i.e. when
BLPR > B
S
PR > B
s
PR > B
L
PU , a patient in the middle of the risk distribution, r ∈ (rsPR , rSPU ), might
force the PR-h to bargain over the choice of not scheduling a CS.5 However, despite possible, such
a bargaining is ineﬀective as far as once the patient enters labor the clinical decision becomes purely
unilateral and therefore is not contractible ex-ante.
3 The empirical framework
We depict here a simple empirical framework to assess the existence of assortative mating. Coherently
with our interpretative model we start by defining a latent variable indicator s∗i = f(ri) so that the
5The decision not to schedule a CS (either appropriate or inappropriate) emerges provided the following inequalities
holds: Aγ ·¡BSPR −BLPU ¢1−γ < bγ ·¡BLPR −BLPU ¢1−γ for r ∈ (rSPR , rSPU ) and (A− a(r))γ ·¡BsPR −BLPU ¢1−γ <
bγ · ¡BLPR −BLPU ¢1−γ for r ∈ (rsPR , rSPR). The latter inequality, referring to the less risky patients in the middle of
the distribution, is more easily met. The economic rent accruing to the provider net of deontic penalties for inappropriate
planned CS is smaller and patient gain over an admission in the PU-h is smaller as well in case an inappropriate CS is
proposed. Notice that no bargaining arises if r < rsPR given that both agents agree on the decision to attempt to a ND.
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dichotomus choice of scheduled CS vs the attempt of a ND si is observed according to the rule:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
“schedule a CS”: si = 1 if s∗i > 0
“attempt a ND”: si = 0 if s∗i ≤ 0
Such a choice can be interpreted, conditionally upon risk and predisposing factors ri, as an “unilateral”,
purely deontic decision rule for a patient delivering in a public hospital. The decision rule shifts from
such a “golden standard” in case the woman chooses to deliver in a private hospital. In a sense we
consider the obstetricians operating in public hospitals as “professional leaders” setting the professional
norm the collegues operating in private hospitals look at. Assuming a parametric linear specification,
the scheduling decision emerges then according to the latent regression:
s∗i = δ1privi + f(ri) = δ1privi + δ2zi + usi (1)
where privi is a dichotomous variable indicating delivery in private hospital, zi is a vector collecting
exogenous observable risk and predisposing factors, while usi is a stochastic term capturing all the
unmeasured characteristics of the woman. The above equation reflects the outcome of a joint decision
process involving the two agents. We would like to interpret the diﬀerence in probability of scheduling in
private hospitals with respect to public as a measure of private departure from the public appropriate,
professional norm.
However, as we argued above, the hospital choice is concomitant to the scheduling process, in some
cases even subject to strategic bargaining considerations. The woman may choose to opt out of a public
hospital admission aware of her health conditions, hospital characteristics and the clinical decision rule
adopted there. Therefore the two classes of hospital will attract women with diﬀerent preferences and
diﬀerent clinical characteristics. Some of these determinants are observed, other are not, forcing us
to consider equation 1 jointly with a hospital choice process. This process is driven by the following
stochastic latent indicator:
priv∗i = β
0
1xi + uhi (2)
10
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and determines the observable variable privi according to the rule:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
“refer to PR-h” privi = 1 if priv∗i > 0
“refer to PU-h” privi = 0 if priv∗i ≤ 0
The vector xi contains exogenous observable risk factors and socio-economic characteristics of the
woman and uhi is a stochastic error term. Omission of common unobservable variables in equations
1 and 2 introduces a correlation pattern between the two stochastic components (usi, uhi). Adding
to equations 1 and 2 the assumption that the latter are independently and identically distributed as
bivariate normal: ⎛
⎜⎜⎝
usi
uhi
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ∼ IIDN
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 ρ
ρ 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (3)
results in a bivariate probit model with endogenous dummy. This model belongs to the general class of
simultaneous equation models with both continuous and discrete endogenous variables introduced by
Heckman (1978). Maddala (1983) lists this (as Model 6) among the recursive models for dichotomous
choice. The recursive structure builds on a first reduced form equation for the potentially endoge-
nous dummy (the hospital type choice equation 2 in our case)- and a second structural form equation
determining the outcome of interest (the scheduling decision process 1).6
Some hints on the interpretation of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ in our modelling exercises can be
obtained putting forward the following simplifying decomposition of the two error terms of the model:
usi = ϕ1εri + ϕ2εpi + η1i
uhi = γ1εri + γ2εpi + η2i
where εri indicates unobserved adverse clinical conditions relevant for delivery, εpi represents her un-
observable tastes in favour of a CS (like degree of aversion to pain and suﬀering, taste for natural
6In health economics the model has been used to analyse the eﬀect of supplemental insurance ownership
on dycotomous health demand indicators (see Holly et al., 1998, Buchmueller et al., 2004) and to explore
endogeneity of self-reported disability measure for the decision to apply for social benefits (Benitez-Silva et al.,
2004).
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processes), while η1i and η2i are the residual unobserved random component of the two latent indica-
tors, normally distributed with zero mean, variances σ2η1 and σ
2
η2 respectively, uncorrelated with each
other. We assume that εri and εpi are normal, zero mean, uncorrelated with each other and with
η1i and η2i, with variances σ
2
r and σ
2
p respectively.
7 In this setting, the correlation between the error
terms of the two probit equations arises only from the two common unobserved components εri and
εpi: ρ = E(u1i, u2i) = γ1ϕ1σ
2
r + γ2ϕ2σ
2
p = ρr+ ρp. This splits the correlation coeﬃcient into two parts:
the first term ρr captures a selection mechanism related to clinical risk, the second one ρp, relates
to the preferences of the woman. The coeﬃcients γ1, γ2, ϕ1, ϕ2 are clearly not identifiable, but are
inserted because speculating on their sign according to the assumptions presented in section 2 we are
able to provide some possible interpretations of the identified correlation coeﬃcient ρ. Coherently with
the discussion of the previous section we can derive the following implications. Concerning the risk
component, γ1 < 0 and ϕ1 > 0, i.e. ρr < 0. This means that the more frail patient refer to the higher
quality hospital, the public one in our case. This kind of nonrandom selection to hospitals has been
strongly evidenced by Geweke et al. (2003). Turning to the unobservable preference component, our
definition of εpi implies ϕ2 > 0, while the sign of γ2 is more controversial. Recalling the alternative
preference patterns sketched above, in the “preference for scheduled CS” case we expect γ2 > 0, while
the “preference for ND in a pleasant environment” case is compatible with γ2 < 0. Following our theo-
retical framework, we discard this last pattern as unplausible. Therefore, it is possible to state that the
preference component ρp is positive. When the self-sorting mechanism due to unobservable preferences
can be ascribed to a recognizable practice variation across providers, then assortative mating can be
claimed to be in place. In the above context, this implies ρp > 0 and δ1 > 0. Given that the identified
parameter is ρ, the practical implementation of a test for the presence of assortative mating is con-
fronted with the diﬃculty represented by the presence of the risk component ρr. The negative (positive)
sign of ρ testifies that the risk component ρr (preference component ρp) prevails upon the other. The
relative importance of the two components is an empirical matter. The richer the set of risk control
7The variances of the two idiosyncratic components, σ2η1 and σ
2
η2 are assumed to get values making the normalization
V ar(u1i) = V ar(u2i) = 1 to hold.
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available to the researcher the larger will be the role played by the patient unobserved preference and
the scope for assessing the existence of assortative mating.
The implications for the empirical tests are the following. First, when the correlation coeﬃcient is
found to be statistically equal to zero, the evidence about assortative mating is inconclusive, but the
resulting exogeneity of the dummy allows to use only the treatment equation for investigating practice
variation. Second, a significant impact of provider’s dummy toghether with a positive correlation
coeﬃcient testifies the existence of assortative mating (while a negative correlation coeﬃcient does not
allow to draw any conclusion on this mechanism).
4 Scheduling Cesarean Section delivery and self-selection into
hospital types in Italy
4.1 Data description
We work on a dataset coming from the “Indagine Statistica Multiscopo sulle Famiglie: condizioni
di salute e ricorso ai servizi sanitari” (ISMF), a national household survey conducted by the Italian
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) every 5 years. The last available survey was conducted from
september 1999 to august 2000 when a sample of 40119 households were interviewed. The survey
provides a full account of individual health condition, health care utilization, biometric parameters
plus socio-economic status (education, working condition) and other relevant economic variables like
complementary private health insurance holding. In this study we exploit a section of the survey
focussing on the last delivery experienced by female components of each sampled household in the
five years before the interview. Delivery experience is described in an individual self-compiled part of
the survey. Data about mode of delivery, health problems suﬀered and therapies underwent during
pregnancy and delivery are self-reported. Therefore we do not rely on approximate methods based on
administrative data, like the one used by Epstein and Nicholson (2005), to identify CS scheduling. This
is critical in case of strategical miscoding. We have 4516 women filling in this section of the survey for
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a corresponding number of deliveries occurring in the four years before the interview.
We control for a full set of regressors (see the following Table 2 for a list, and table A.1 in the
Appendix for descriptive statistics) including individual predisposing risk factors for CS delivery and
some socioeconomic variables. Within our interpretative framework, we expect risk factor variables
to aﬀect negatively the probability of referring to a private hospital and positively the CS scheduling
probability. Turning to the socioeconomic regressors, education captures heterogeneity in preferences
in both equations and the direction of its eﬀect is more controversial. It is important to clarify that
as far as out-of-pocket payments are absent in our case study, the insurance dummy variable does not
capture the eﬀect of a lessened individual budget constraint. As far as its role is to control for the
preference structure of the woman, the sign of its coeﬃcient is not predictable in both equations.8
Theoretical identification of the recursive probit model is achieved as soon as both equations of
the model contains a varying exogenous regressor (Wilde, 2000). However, to avoid that identification
strongly relies on model’s functional form we use as instruments a set of dummy variables conveying
information on the type of residential area, ranging from central metropolitan to small rural area. As
hospital choice is influenced by the local availability of providers, these indicators are meant to control
for discrepancies in the choice set of hospitals considered by the woman. We also include as instrument
in the hospital choice equation a dummy indicating whether the woman has a self-employed occupation.
As a robustness check, we estimated the model without any exclusion restriction and found very similar
results, showing that conditionally on the other explanatory variables, our extra regressors do not
influence the probability of CS scheduling.
Given the self-compiled nature of the questionnaire our set of risk factors do not include most of
the clinical conditions usually controlled for in the health econometrics analysis of CS variation (see for
8It might be argued that the insurance dummy is potentially endogenous in the treatment equation, as suggested
by Mossialos et al. (2005). Accounting for endogeneity of insurance would require a more general model with a third
equation explaining insurance ownership. Given the diﬃculties in performing reliable inference on exogeneity in small
samples even in the bivariate context (Monfardini and Radice, 2006), we consider our sample not appropriate for this
exercise and leave this issue for future research.
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example Dubay et al., 1999). Major lacks are controls for breech presentation, fetal distress and prior
CS. The latter variable is known to be a major predisposing factor for CS delivery. In order to overcome
this limitation we exploit information about primiparity. However we are only able to approximately
identify primiparae women. We code as primipara a woman with no other natural children living in their
family older than that the surveyed delivery refers to. This strategy is quite plausible provided that in
Italy almost all children are placed in the care of their mother in case of parents divorce. According to
this identification criterion, primiparas are about 40% of our national sample, a “realistic” proportion
in Italy. We include this dummy for primiparity and its interaction with the dummy indicating whether
the woman is aged more than 36 in a second specification of the model. We report the estimation
results for both specification as Model 1 and Model 2 hereafter.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
4.2 Main results
Table 3 presents the main findings emerging from the following specifications: univariate probit, seem-
ingly unrelated bivariate probit, and recursive probit model. To obtain MLE of the latter models, we
resorted to the command “biprobit” of STATA 9, which exploits the Newton-Raphson maximization
method and allows for Hessian-based estimation of the asymptotic covariance matrix. Such command,
presented in STATA only for the SURE bivariate probit, sorts out the correct estimation procedure
also when one of the dependent dichotomous variable is included as a regressor for the other probit
equation, as the two models share the same log-likelihood “mechanics”. In the recursive probit model
the PRIVATE dummy proves to be positive and highly significant, picking up hospital specific factors
that increases the probability of a scheduled CS. To evaluate the exogeneity status of this dummy we
compute alternative exogeneity tests analysed in Monfardini and Radice (2006): conditional moments
(CM), diﬀerent versions of the lagrange multiplier test (LM1, LM2, LM3, LM4), likelihood ratio (LR)
and the Wald-type test based on the esimated value of the correlation coeﬃcient (RHO). As expected,
we find that the dummy is endogenously codetermined with the scheduled CS equation. The battery
15
Page 15 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
of exogeneity tests presented in the bottom part of the table provides conflicting indications at a first
sight. The CM, LM1, LR and RHO tests lead to strong rejection of the hypothesis of exogeneity,
while LM2, LM3 and LM4 support the opposite evidence, i.e. in favour of exogeneity of the hospital
type dummy. However, the Monte Carlo evidence presented in Monfardini and Radice (2006), helps in
distinguishing and interpreting these results, as the latter set of tests exhibit finite sample distributions
remarkably far from the asymptotic ones. This leads us to conclude that in our case study the bivariate
endogenous dummy model is the appropriate setting for drawing some consistent inference on hospital
type diﬀerences in CS scheduling rates.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
A full account of the bivariate endogenous dummy probit estimation exercise is available in the
Appendix. For the sake of brevity we only notice here that overall results are coherent with expected
signs. Each risk factor contributes to increase the probability of scheduling a CS, while they are almost
uniformly not significant in driving hospital choice. A noticeable exception is represented by newborn
weight: babies with low weight at birth are less frequently delivered in a private hospital. Socioeconomic
variables (education) seem to be irrelevant in determining CS planning probability with the exception
of insurance holding. However, being self-employed, holding a private health insurance and being more
educated makes the woman to have a higher probability to deliver in a private hospital. The coeﬃcients
of the primipara dummies in Model 2 imply that a woman delivering for the first time is less likely to
deliver with a scheduled CS when younger than 36, but more likely to do so when aged more than 36.
In broader terms, if we restrain ourselves to the individual observable eﬀects, it seems that scheduling
is driven, as expected, by some relevant risk factor but is less so by socio-economic variables. The
reverse applies to the decision to opt for a private admission. Even more coarsely we could say that
according to observables CS scheduling is a clinical matter and opting to a private hospital has to do
with socio-economics.
Turning to the two main coeﬃcients of interest, the following comments apply. The negative and
significant correlation coeﬃcient suggests that among the two self-selection forces we figured out in
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section 3, the one related to preferences is dominated by the unobserved frailty one. This allocates the
more risky patients to public hospitals, i.e. the higher quality hospitals. The significant and positive
dummy coeﬃcient indicates that, net of observable and unobservable confoundings, we measure a
significantly higher inclination to practice CS scheduling in private hospitals. This is, as we suggested,
a precondition to interpret the correlation coeﬃcient in the light of assortative mating mechanism.
Because of its measured negative sign, we conclude that assortative mating is of minor relevance in our
case, even if we cannot exclude it to be present. It is worth noticing that according to the bivariate
SURE probit model the estimated correlation is positive and therefore apparently coherent with an
opposite interpretation of the self-selection process at work. As the SURE model is actually nested in
the endogenous dummy one, we are able to conclude that the former is rejected, with the coeﬃcient of
the dummy being significantly diﬀerent from zero.9
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
In Table 4 we look at the appropriate scheduled CS probability diﬀerentials to evaluate the impact of
the PRIVATE hospital dummy for a set of representative women. These are characterized by diﬀerent
risk factors and primiparity status. Given the lack of major risk factors in our specification, the
considered profiles describe intermediate levels of riskiness ri. Therefore, in line with our intepretative
model of section 2, these representative women may concretely switch to a private hospital. Incidentally
we notice that, coherently with our framework of section 2, the more risky woman is less likely to refer
to a private hospital. For all typical women the impact of the PRIVATE hospital dummy is positive and
significant as emerges from column (6) where we evaluate the standard error of the diﬀerence through
the Delta method. Our low risk primipara has a probability of 8.94% of getting a scheduled CS in public
hospitals, increasing to 15.82% when she refers to a private one.10 Our assertion on public hospitals
practice as representing the appropriate, professional norm suggests to look for a measure useful for
9The endogenous dummy variable model is therefore the appropriate one to conduct a meaningful profiling analysis of
healthcare providers (see Normand et al., 1997) acknowledging the public/private diﬀerence.
10It is worth noticing here that these figures lie below the target set for low risk primiparas in the US plan “Tracking
Healthy People 2010” (see US Department of Health and Human Resources, 2000).
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evaluating the extent to which private hospitals move away from this golden standard. To this purpose,
we compute the percentage change of the probability of receiving a scheduled CS in private with respect
to the corresponding figure in public hospitals. For the primipara high risk woman such percentage
diﬀerence is equal to 42%. For her low risk counterpart the percent change reaches a huge 77%, i.e.
almost doubled. The observed percentage diﬀerence across risk profiles is enormous indicating that in
our case study private hospitals scheduling practice exceeds the public norm the more the less risky is
the patient.
5 Conclusions
We study practice variation in scheduling of cesarean section delivery across public and private hospitals.
In the health economics literature the prevailing approach ascribes variation in CS adoption to physician
unilateral response to a broad set of economic incentives. We adopt here a novel perspective and look
at the role played by patients’ preferences for the treatment, allowing for the presence of an assortative
mating process driven by provider style of practice. We discuss which circumstances make it feasible
an empirical assessment of assortative mating in healthcare markets and argue that our case study is
well suited to this purpose.
The econometric model adopted for the endogenous discrete variable represented by treatment is
Heckman’s recursive probit model. The analysis of practice variation across alternative providers is
performed by including among the determinants for the probability of the treatment, a dummy variable
indicating the provider chosen by the patient. The latter is determined by an individual choice process in
which patients’ preferences for the alternative treatments and information on provider’s style of practice
play a major role. This brings about self-selection of patients into providers based on observables and
unobservables characteristics that also determine the given treatment, and makes the provider dummy
variable potentially endogenous. Unobserved variables are both related to patient’s preferences and
unobserved severity conditions. The first set originates a nonrandom selection which has to do with
assortative mating, and implies a positive correlation coeﬃcient. However, this eﬀect can be partially
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or totally oﬀset by a self-selection of opposite sign introduced by the second set of unobservables. The
negative sign of the latter is a mantained assumption that finds sound justification in the higher quality
of public hospitals, attracting women with more severe unobservable conditions.
In our case study on an Italian sample we obtain strong evidence against the hypothesis of exogeneity
of hospital type dummy in the equation determining CS scheduling probability. Our results suggest
that a self-selection mechanism allocating the more risky patients to public hospitals is prevailing over
the assortative mating mechanism operating through unobservable preferences for the treatment. After
controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics, women admitted to a private hospital are
more likely to receive a scheduled CS at any risk profile. Thus, working in a private hospital seems
to insulate the physicians from the adherence to a prevailing professional norm set by their public
hospital counterparts. Looking at the percentage change of the probability of receiving a scheduled CS
in private with respect to the corresponding figure in public hospitals, we find that in our case study
private hospitals scheduling practice exceeds the public norm the more the less risky is the patient.
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TABLES TO BE INSERTED IN THE MAIN TEXT 
Table 1. Cesarean section (CS) incidence across hospital types 
 
CS rate Scheduled CS rate 
CS rate 
conditional on 
laboring 
 "Market" 
Shares 
Public hospital 27.5%  16.9% 12.8%   91.4% 
Private hospital 42.4%  32.3% 14.9%     8.6% 
All 28.8%  18.2.% 12.9%  100.0% 
 
 Table 2. Variables description  
 
Variable  
Scheduled =1 if woman delivers with a scheduled cesarean section; =0 otherwise 
Private =1 if woman delivers in a private hospital; =0 otherwise 
Risk Factors Primipar                        
=1 if woman delivers for the first time; =0 otherwise 
Amniocen =1 if the woman underwent early prenatal diagnostic checks ("villi coriali" or "amniocentesi"); =0 otherwise 
Diabetes =1 if the woman self-reports having suffered from diabetes during her pregnancy; =0 otherwise 
Gestosis =1 if the woman self-reports having suffered from "gestosi" during her pregnancy; =0 otherwise 
Hyperten =1 if the woman self-reports having suffered from blood hypertension during her pregnancy; =0 otherwise 
BMI Body Mass Index (=bodyweight/(height/100)2) 
Newborn weigth weight of the newborn in kilograms 
Newborn weigth sq weight of the newborn squared 
No. scans number of fetal ultrasound scans done during pregnancy 
Smoked =1 if the woman was an abitual smoker; =0 otherwise 
Age +36 =1 if woman is older than 36; =0 otherwise 
Age age in years 
Agesq age squared 
 Socio-economic variables 
Edu-high =1 if woman holds an high education degree; =0 otherwise 
Edu-low =1 if woman holds a low education degree; =0 otherwise 
Edu-medium =1 if woman holds a medium education degree; =0 otherwise 
Insured =1 if the woman is covered by private health insurance 
Self-employed =1 if the woman is self-employed; =0 otherwise 
 Other controls 
NW =1 if the woman resides in a North-West region; =0 otherwise 
NE =1 if the woman resides in a North-East region; =0 otherwise 
CEN =1 if the woman resides in a Centre region; =0 otherwise 
ISL =1 if the woman resides in a Island region (Sicily or Sardinia); =0 otherwise 
Area-metropol =1 if the woman resides in a metropolitan area; =0 otherwise 
Area-suburban =1 if the woman resides in a metropolitan suburb; =0 otherwise 
Area-small =1 if the woman resides in a very small commune (less than 2000 inhabitants); =0 otherwise 
Area-medium =1 if the woman resides in a medium-small commune (between 2000 and 10000 inhabitants); =0 otherwise 
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Table 3. Main results 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Estimation results  Estimation results 
 
private 
dummy  ρ  
private 
dummy  ρ 
 Univariate model 
Estimate 0.4343 -  0.4397 - 
St. err -0.0717 -  -0.0717 - 
 Bivariate SURE model 
Estimate - 0.2156  - 0.2176 
St. err - 0.0371  - -0.0371 
 Recursive probit model 
Estimate 1.4118 -0.5062  1.4607 -0.5279 
St. err 0.3751 0.1842  0.3503 0.1717 
      
 Exogeneity tests  Exogeneity tests 
Test statistic p value  statistic p value 
CM -1.9294 0.0537  -2.0678 0.0387 
LM1 3.7732 0.0521  4.3207 0.0377 
LM2 0.0852 0.7704  0.0981 0.7541 
LM3 0.0954 0.7574  0.1093 0.7410 
LM4 0.0816 0.7751  0.0820 0.7746 
LR 4.7799 0.0288  5.4617 0.0194 
RHO -2.7472 0.0060  -3.0763 0.0021 
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Table 4  
Predicted effect of  hospital type dummy on probability of scheduling CS 
(1) 
Woman type 
(2) 
Pr(priv) 
(3) 
Pr(CS) 
(4) 
Pr(CS|priv) 
(5) 
Pr(CS|pub)  
(6) 
Difference (s.e.) 
  
 Irrespective of primiparity (based on Model 1) 
Low risk 0.0958 0.1100 0.1811 0.1025 0.0786*** (0.0262) 
High risk 0.0585 0.3270 0.4495 0.3193 0.1302**  (0.0499) 
 Primipara (based on Model 2) 
Low risk 0.0946 0.0959 0.1582 0.0894 0.0688**  (0.0262) 
High risk 0.0573 0.2997 0.4153 0.2927 0.1226**  (0.0520) 
 Multipara (based on Model 2) 
Low risk 0.0966 0.1311 0.2137 0.1222 0.0915*** (0.0289) 
High risk 0.0587 0.3660 0.4978 0.3578 0.1400*** (0.0515) 
 
(1)  
Low risk woman is characterized by the absence of clinical risk (all the dummy variables indicating severity of the 
pregnancy set to zero); variables age, No. scans, BMI, newborn weight set to sample averages; medium education 
degree;  without private insurance, not self-employed, delivering in 1996, residing in the North-East of Italy in a 
metropolitan area 
High risk woman differs from the previous for the following risk factors: newborn weight equal to 2.5 Kg, BMI=30, 
suffers from gestosis 
 (2)  
Marginal probability of referring to private hospital, conditional to the explanatory variables x. Conditioning to x is 
omitted from notation in all column headings. 
(3)  
Marginal probability of delivering with scheduled CS, conditional to the explanatory variables x. 
(4)  
Probability of planning c-section conditional to referring to private hospital (and to explanatory variables x), evaluated 
as: )1(/)1,1_()1|1_( ====== privprprivCSplprprivCSplpr  through the appropriate bivariate and 
univariate normal cumulative distribution function.  
(5)  
Probability of planning c-section conditional to referring to public hospital (and to explanatory variables x), evaluated 
as: )0(/)0,1_()0|1_( ====== privprprivCSplprprivCSplpr  
(6)  
The variance of the estimated difference between the two conditional probabilities has been evaluated through the Delta 
Method, exploiting analytical expressions of first order derivatives of the bivariate and univariate normal cumulative 
distribution function. The details of computation are available upon request. 
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 APPENDIX  
 
Table A.1  
Descriptive statistics 
 Full sample  Public hospital admissions (PRIV==0)  
Private hospital 
admissions (PRIV==1) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Private 0.086 0.279  0.000   1.000  
Primipar 0.471 0.499  0.471 0.499  0.473 0.499 
Diabetes 0.019 0.137  0.019 0.135  0.023 0.151 
Gestosis 0.037 0.189  0.039 0.193  0.021 0.142 
Hyperten 0.046 0.209  0.048 0.214  0.026 0.159 
BMI 22.69 3.455  22.72 3.475  22.52 3.238 
Newborn weigth 3.263 0.509  3.265 0.515  3.239 0.437 
No. scans 5.378 2.319  5.359 2.322  5.579 2.275 
Amniocen 0.238 0.426  0.232 0.422  0.305 0.461 
Smoked 0.240 0.427  0.239 0.427  0.248 0.432 
Age 32.17 4.988  32.170 4.943  32.21 5.452 
Age +36 0.249 0.432  0.244 0.429  0.305 0.461 
Edu-high 0.108 0.311  0.103 0.304  0.168 0.374 
Edu-medium 0.467 0.499  0.464 0.499  0.499 0.501 
Edu-low 0.367 0.482  0.373 0.484  0.299 0.459 
Insured 0.157 0.364  0.155 0.362  0.176 0.381 
Self-employed 0.441 0.497  0.432 0.495  0.537 0.499 
NW 0.176 0.381  0.185 0.388  0.085 0.279 
NE 0.213 0.409  0.222 0.416  0.119 0.324 
CEN 0.158 0.365  0.161 0.367  0.124 0.330 
ISL 0.129 0.335  0.126 0.332  0.129 0.336 
Area-metropol 0.081 0.273  0.074 0.262  0.155 0.362 
Area-suburban 0.096 0.295  0.093 0.291  0.127 0.333 
Area-small 0.186 0.389  0.196 0.397  0.080 0.272 
Area-medium 0.286 0.452  0.288 0.453  0.266 0.443 
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Table A.2  
Full estimation results 
 
  Model 1    Model 2  
 Coeff. Std.err P-value  Coeff. Std.err P-value 
SCHEDULED 1.4118 0.3751 0.0000  1.4607 0.3510 0.0000 
Private     -0.1760 0.0524 0.0010 
Primipar     0.3032 0.1065 0.0040 
Primipar +36 0.0017 0.1572 0.9910  -0.0026 0.1596 0.9870 
Diabetes 0.1484 0.1050 0.1570  0.1436 0.1050 0.1710 
Hyperten 0.3123 0.1143 0.0060  0.3192 0.1149 0.0050 
Gestosis 0.0666 0.0500 0.1830  0.0668 0.0500 0.1820 
Smoked 0.1211 0.0533 0.0230  -0.0058 0.0646 0.9290 
Age +36 0.0663 0.0547 0.2260  -0.9780 0.2332 0.0000 
Newborn weight 0.0404 0.0092 0.0000  0.0991 0.0361 0.0060 
Newborn weight sq. -1.0151 0.2322 0.0000  0.0277 0.0064 0.0000 
BMI 0.1053 0.0360 0.0030  0.0615 0.0548 0.2610 
Amniocen 0.0286 0.0064 0.0000  0.0412 0.0092 0.0000 
No. scans -0.0851 0.0965 0.3780  -0.0629 0.0970 0.5170 
Edu-LOW -0.0453 0.0972 0.6410  -0.0155 0.0981 0.8750 
Edu-MEDIUM -0.0369 0.1167 0.7520  -0.0077 0.1176 0.9480 
Edu-HIGH 0.1485 0.0612 0.0150  0.1434 0.0613 0.0190 
Insured -0.2192 0.0746 0.0030  -0.2059 0.0741 0.0050 
NW -0.2461 0.0714 0.0010  -0.2354 0.0706 0.0010 
NE -0.0757 0.0714 0.2890  -0.0698 0.0707 0.3240 
CEN -0.0907 0.0718 0.2070  -0.0836 0.0717 0.2440 
ISL -0.0154 0.0647 0.8120  -0.0085 0.0647 0.8950 
Year 1997 0.0641 0.0630 0.3090  0.0623 0.0630 0.3230 
Year 1998 0.0796 0.0625 0.2030  0.0768 0.0625 0.2190 
Year 1999-00 0.2823 0.4219 0.5030  0.3061 0.4234 0.4700 
        
PRIVATE        
Primipar     -0.0119 0.0682 0.8610 
Primipar +36     0.0212 0.1260 0.8670 
Diabetes 0.1961 0.1878 0.2970  0.1992 0.1877 0.2890 
Hyperten -0.1648 0.1683 0.3280  -0.1630 0.1681 0.3320 
Gestosis -0.2018 0.1933 0.2970  -0.2036 0.1928 0.2910 
Newborn weight -0.0120 0.0088 0.1750  1.0572 0.4460 0.0180 
Newborn weight sq. -0.1013 0.0475 0.0330  -0.1793 0.0695 0.0100 
BMI 0.0015 0.0007 0.0350  -0.0123 0.0088 0.1630 
Amniocen 0.1261 0.0679 0.0630  0.1247 0.0681 0.0670 
No. scans 0.0193 0.0112 0.0860  0.0193 0.0112 0.0850 
Edu-LOW 1.0582 0.4481 0.0180  0.2818 0.1503 0.0610 
Edu-MEDIUM -0.1794 0.0696 0.0100  0.4684 0.1500 0.0020 
Edu-HIGH 0.1342 0.0594 0.0240  0.6336 0.1637 0.0000 
Age 0.2801 0.1508 0.0630  -0.1078 0.0478 0.0240 
Age sq. 0.4666 0.1499 0.0020  0.0016 0.0007 0.0270 
Insured 0.6312 0.1631 0.0000  0.1898 0.0763 0.0130 
Self-employed 0.1881 0.0764 0.0140  0.1317 0.0596 0.0270 
NW -0.7042 0.0970 0.0000  -0.7027 0.0975 0.0000 
NE -0.5204 0.0895 0.0000  -0.5187 0.0895 0.0000 
CEN -0.5119 0.0895 0.0000  -0.5094 0.0898 0.0000 
ISL -0.2109 0.0838 0.0120  -0.2113 0.0837 0.0120 
Area-metropol. 0.4265 0.0925 0.0000  0.4258 0.0924 0.0000 
Area-suburban 0.2420 0.0934 0.0100  0.2401 0.0929 0.0100 
Area-small -0.3017 0.0955 0.0020  -0.3025 0.0953 0.0020 
Area-medium -0.0076 0.0685 0.9120  -0.0097 0.0683 0.8870 
Constant -1.3406 1.0322 0.1940  -1.2023 1.0382 0.2470 
ρ -0.5062 0.1842   -0.5284 0.1717  
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